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1.  Introduction
Why is home-ownership important?  Are bad neighborhoods, with homes in disrepair and
unsafe streets, simply a reflection of the poverty of the residents, or are low rates of home-
ownership a contributing factor?  Is there a role for public policy?  These questions are a
major concern to governments and NGOs, which have long supported home-ownership. 
Sociologists and economists have found evidence of important spillovers within a community
from home-ownership. But theoretical research on the decision to own or rent a home has
ignored such spillovers (instead focusing on externalities between landlord and tenant), and
does not confront the issue of the determination of the quality and composition of
neighborhoods.
1  This lacuna in our understanding means that we cannot analyze policies that
promote home ownership as a means to improve the quality of communities. A complete
theory would explain the quality of a community as the outcome of the decisions of all
households in a metropolitan area, taking into account the general equilibrium effects that
inhere in this problem.  The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple version of such a
theory.
We study a model with spillovers, in which the appreciation of the price of a home
depends on the investments that other community residents make in their homes.  An
investment that raises the expected value of one's own home by a dollar raises aggregate
wealth by more than a dollar since other homes also rise in value.  Because individual
households ignore this spillover in making investment decisions, individual choices need not
be socially optimal. 
We obtain two main results.  First, there may be multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria in
the fraction of homeowners in a community.
2 In the bad equilibrium, the fraction of home-
owners is low and the expected appreciation of home prices is low because the fraction of
home-owners is low.  In the good equilibrium, high levels of home ownership and home
improvement effort on the part of a large fraction of residents renders these choices optimal
for the household.  Thus, a temporary subsidy to home-ownership in a neighborhood can be
                    
     
1 Representative of this work are Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and the literature
surveyed in Rosen (1985).
     
2Our model thus contributes to the burgeoning literature on coordination failures.  A
survey focusing on  macroeconomics is Cooper (1999); a survey focusing on development
economics is Hoff and Stiglitz (1999).3
Pareto-improving.  The model thus formalizes the idea, which seems to underlie some
government actions, that a "critical mass" of home-owners can change the quality of a whole
community.  For example, in announcing the recent decision to award a Harlem
neighborhood a grant to help finance row houses for low- and moderate-income home-
owners, an April 16, 1998 New York Times article entitled "Dreams, and Now Hope,
Among the Ruins," described the decision as follows: 
"it was the sheer number of new home-ownership development and retail projects
that clinched the decision to award the community the $4.65 million grant....'I'm a
big believer in critical mass,' [HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo] said. 'If you have a
distressed neighborhood, and you do something very small, it doesn't turn around the
dynamic.'"
We also obtain a striking result on community formation.  We find that under
plausible conditions, market forces will lead home-owners and renters to live in separate
communities.  This has implications for the way in which differences in incomes (which in
our model imply differences in the cost of financing home equity) translate into differences in
the quality of the community in which a household lives and raises its children.  Recent
empirical work calls attention to the role of neighborhoods in the transmission of inequality
across generations (Jencks and Mayer, 1994).  We are able to show that even if the poor do
not have different preferences for housing than the rich and even if they internalize
externalities no less than the rich do, rich and poor households may live in communities that
exhibit very different social characteristics--the rich in a community with high levels of
home-ownership and high levels of civic engagement, and the poor in a community with low
levels of both.
Let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail:
(a) Capital markets are imperfect.  We assume that the interest rate for individual
borrowers is higher than that for lenders.
3
(b)  Home-ownership affects behavior and has persistent effects on the quality of homes in
a neighborhood. This reflects the consensus of a large empirical literature. 
Controlling for income, education, and other socioeconomic characteristics, home-
                    
     
3If, on the contrary, there were perfect neoclassical capital markets--with no information
asymmetries, transactions costs, or tax distortions, then household income would affect only
the quantity of housing services consumed, not the form of the housing contract (rental vs.
home-ownership).4
owners are more likely than renters to participate in neighborhood and block
associations (Cox, 1982, Rohe and Stegman, 1994, Rohe and Stewart, 1996), to vote
in local elections (Verba et al., 1995), to become informed about their political
leaders (Rohe and Weber, 1996, DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998), and to contribute to
collective actions to deal with threats to property values (Skogan).
4 Compared to
absentee landlords, homeowners invest more in home maintenance and undertake
home maintenance more frequently (Galster, 1987).
                      
(c)  Actions that an individual household takes to improve the value of its home increase
the return to others of taking similar actions. Consider the following examples:
A. An individual improves the exterior physical appearance of his house.
B. An individual takes care to keep his home free of litter, pests, and weeds, and
to report to the police those who paint graffiti or illegally dump wastes near
his home.
C. An individual contacts a local government official to complain that municipal
garbage collection on his street is inadequate, or that drugs are being sold, or
that a bar near his home is contributing to litter, noise, and crime.
D. An individual quickly repairs damage caused by vandals
E. An individual tries to impose social sanctions (spreading negative gossip) on
a neighbor who does not keep his home up to community standards.
Observe in each case that an individual's effort can yield a private return, but there is
strength in numbers:  when a greater number of residents take similar actions, each
resident's individual payoff is higher. The mechanisms for this complementarity
vary.  In A, it may be adherence to community norms or the fact that it is difficult
for an individual to increase the resale price of his home through his own investment
if the neighborhood as a whole is viewed as undesirable.
5  In B, there are
                    
     
4These findings do not appear to reflect merely the fact that people with unobservable
characteristics that make them better citizens tend to choose home-ownership.  Almost no
differences are found between home-owners and renters with respect to voting in national
elections (Verba et al., p. 453), participation in political party organizations and school
groups (Reingold, 1995), or views on public issues or confidence in most major institutions
(Rossi and Weber, 1996).
     
5In his case study of one metropolitan area, Anderson (1994, p. 27) observed:  [T]hough
owners might make numerous improvements to their dwelling, these changes by themselves5
technological effects (weeds and pests spread) and sociological effects (criminals are
emboldened if individual citizens do not respond to the first signs of disorder, as
emphasized in Kelling and Wilson (1982). As one Tucson resident observed in The
Arizona Daily Star (November 1999):  "When an area has graffiti, people feel
comfortable dumping debris, so [the area] just declines and declines."  In case C, an
individual resident may have little voice if there is no institutional voice in the
community to ensure that the police and other government officials do their job
6. 
Regarding D, sociologists have argued that if there is evidence in a community of
vandalism, e.g., a broken window, prospective vandals will tend to see the "cost of
crime" as low and that, in turn, will tend to increase the crime rate.  In turn, "each
new crime promotes psychological and physical withdrawal of residents from public
life, which reduces vigilance within the neighborhood and undermines the capacity
for collective organization, making additional criminal activity more likely" (Massey
and Denton, 1993, p. 13).  In this view, if all residents monitor their own property
and quickly repair any damage caused by vandals, then the crime rate will be reduced
and residents will in fact view the costs of vigilance as low.  Finally, in E, strength
in numbers arises because reputation effects are only as strong as the information
flows that sustain them.
7
We will represent these many forms of value-enhancing behavior by a single index,
"home improvement effort" and, for simplicity, we will assume that it can take only one of
two values.  The fundamental element of our model is that the relative return to high effort
(relative to low effort) is increasing in the fraction of households in a neighborhood who
                                                           
do not increase their value.  Property values increase when the area itself is defined as
desirable..." Galster, 1987 and Ioannides, 1996 find that investments in home maintenance
and home improvement by neighboring homeowners are complements.
     
6See, for example, Medoff and Sklar, 1994, p. 72:  "The community meeting was one of
[the neighborhood association's] earliest lessons in power politics.  Residents saw that by
coming together in large numbers and demanding what they were rightfully entitled to, they
could change their neighborhood for the better."  See also Anderson, pp. 107, 109, for a
description of a night vigil by residents to close down crack houses; and Skogan for a march
by residents to close down a liquor store.
     
7Formal models include Cooter 1995 (complementarities in informal enforcement of
social norms), diPasquale and Glaeser 1998 (complementarities in investment in social
networks), Akerlof and Yellen 1994 (complementarities in citizen efforts to reduce crime),
and Chwe 1999 (the strength of weak ties).6
expend high effort. As emphasized above, this assumption is motivated by many different
kinds of empirical studies, and can be derived from models focusing on a variety of different
kinds of spillovers.
We begin in Section 2 of the paper by presenting a model of a single community.  In
any generation of households, each household chooses the amount of home equity to purchase
and the level of home improvement effort to expend.  High effort produces a surplus in the
form of expected capital gains, but only residents with a sufficiently high equity stake in their
home will have an incentive to expend high effort. There is a trade-off--if the household
purchases sufficiently high home equity to have an incentive to expend high effort, then it
will obtain the surplus, but it may have to borrow to finance the purchase.  This means that a
low-income household will want to become a homeowner only if the expected price
appreciation is high enough to offset the costs of borrowing.  When more households become
homeowners who expend high effort, expected price appreciation is greater.  There are
multiple equilibria in the cut-off income level above which households become homeowners.
 There may exist a bad equilibrium where a minority fraction of households buy enough
equity to put in high effort, the resulting spillovers are low, and this supports the majority
decision to stay renters. 
Inefficiency may arise because there is a divergence between an individual
household's private return from its choice, and the social return.  This also means that a
restricted menu of home equity contracts (for example, zero equity or full home ownership)
may be offered by each owner, no one has an incentive to experiment with a broader set of
possible contracts, yet that broader set of contracts would make possible a Pareto-dominant
equilibrium.
Section 3 of the paper allows for migration across communities.  Now there is a third
source of possible inefficiency:  neighborhood choice.  We derive conditions under which
neighborhoods will be segregated by tenure and stratified by income.  Households may end
up in completely segregated neighborhoods even when this is inefficient, because there are
decreasing returns to effort within a community.
2.  A Single Community Housing Model
We consider a community consisting of single-family homes. Successive generations of7
households flow in and out of this community over time.  We model this in the following
way. 
A.  People and Timing of Events
We divide time into discrete periods.  A new generation of households move into the
community at the beginning of a period, and move out of the community at the end of the
period.  The latter point in time also corresponds to the beginning of the next period, when
the next generation of households move into the community.  We think of a generation of
households as being composed of families who move into the community when the family is
formed, stay in the community during the working lives of the adults, and move away when
the adults retire.
8 
In this ongoing life of a community, our study focuses on the behavior of a particular
generation of households in a single time period.  For simplicity, we assume that the number
of households in every generation is the same as the number of housing units in the
community.  In particular, we take each generation of households, as well as the set of
housing units in the community, to be a continuum of measure one.  This specification makes
every resident household atomistic with respect to the community of residents as a whole.
The households differ only in one respect - their (exogenous) income.  We let y
denote the income of a typical household for the period of its residence in the community. 
Across the continuum of households, we take y to be distributed according to some
distribution function F(.) on an interval Y ” [Y
-, Y
+].  Further, we let w denote the present
value of a household's future income as calculated at the end of the period.  For simplicity,
we posit that w is the same for all households, so that the heterogeneity is only in terms of
current income.
9
                    
     
8  It will be helpful to think of individuals as living for three periods:  when young they
live with their parents in a community chosen by the parents, as adults (with their own
families) they live in a community of their choice (e.g., near their place of work), and as
senior citizens they live in a retirement community.  This story will motivate our utility
specification for households in Section 2D.
     
9  It can be easily checked that our results will hold if we allow for a household's future
income w to be either a deterministic or a stochastic function of its current income y.8
In the period under study, our analysis starts after the households have entered the
community and have received their incomes y.  Each household then selects a housing unit to
live in and negotiates a housing tenure contract with its existing owner.
10  A tenure contract
is a tuple {a, b}, where a ˛ [0, 1] is the fraction of the home that a household "buys" for a
payment of b.  Over and above the right to reside in the home for the period, such a contract
gives the household the right to a fraction of all future revenues generated by the home.  We
will refer to a as the amount of housing equity owned by a household.  A "pure rental
contract" has a = 0, while a "pure ownership contract" has a = 1.
After taking up residence in a home under some tenure contract, a household makes
its borrowing/savings decision, and decides on its level of "home improvement effort".  The
returns to such effort is described in the next subsection; at this stage we simply posit that the
level of this effort is not directly observable to any party other than the household, and so it
cannot be pre-specified in a tenure contract.  At the end of the period, the home is "sold" (to
a next generation household), and the "sales proceeds" are divided up between the household
and the previous owner according to the stipulation a in their tenure contract.
11
B.  The Quality of a Home
At the beginning of every period, each home in the community is endowed with some level
of quality (security, state of repair, attractiveness of the neighborhood, etc.).  In order to
focus on the way that the choices of residents can give rise to heterogeneity in housing
quality in a community, we assume that at the beginning of the period of our study, the
quality level of each home is identical for all units in the community.  We denote this
common quality level by Q
0. 
A resident household can expend effort in home improvement to add to this stock of
                    
     
10  The reader will soon recognize that to be consistent with our model of a long-lived
community, we should allow for the fact that at the beginning of the period, a home may be
"partially owned" by multiple owners.  However, for the ease of presentation, we will tell
the story as if a single owner held 100% equity in a home (while being cognizant of the
alternative possibility in our formal analysis).
     
11  We place the words sold and sales proceeds in quotes because the future household can
also enter into a tenure contract with 0 < a < 1, which is intermediate between renting and
buying.9
quality.  Specifically, each household chooses an action a from the set {e, n}, where e
denotes high effort in home improvement and n denotes minimal effort.  We let q(.) denote
the increment to quality for any particular home.  As discussed in the Introduction, we posit
that for any particular home, q(.) depends on the resident household's effort, as well as the
efforts of other residents in the community.  So, defining x to be the fraction of households
in the community that expend high effort, we assume that:
12 
Assumption 1.  For all x ˛ [0,1],  (a) q(e,x) > q(n,x),  (b) qx(a, x) > 0 for a ˛ {e,n}, and
(c) qx(e, x) > qx(n, x).
Part (b) of the assumption asserts the existence of a spillover effect - other residents'
home improvement efforts enhance the quality of one's own home.  Part (c) says that for a
resident who expends high effort, the spillover is larger than that for a resident who expends
low effort.  Thus, there is complementarity in home improvement efforts of community
residents.  This will play a key role in our analysis of a community equilibrium.  In the
Introduction, we have elaborated on plausible scenarios in which such complementarity
exists. 
During its residence in its home, a household enjoys the quality level Q
0 + q(.).  At
the end of the period, the home is endowed with a quality level Q
1 = g(Q
0 + q(.)).  We
assume that g(.) is strictly increasing, with g(z) £ z for all z.  This implies that at least some
of the increase in housing quality that is achieved in the current period persists in the future.
C.  Housing Prices
The evolution of housing prices in the community will depend on the evolution of housing
quality, which in turn will depend on the behavior of households.  To keep our analysis
simple, we take the following "prices" as primitives of our model. 
Firstly, we take as primitive the "future price" function P ^(Q
1), which is the expected
present value of a home of quality Q
1 as calculated at the end of the period, and assume that
                    
     
12  Since every household in the community is atomistic, from a particular household's
point of view, x represents the number (measure) of all other households who expend high
effort.10




0 + q(a, x)).  This notation emphasizes that individual and community effort levels
affect the future price of a home in the same way as they affect its current quality:  P(e,x) >
P(n,x), Px(a,x) > 0, and Px(e,x) > Px(n,x).  Secondly, we take as primitive the rental rate r
for a housing unit at the beginning of the period.  Since we have assumed that all units are of
the same quality at this point in time, we posit that the rental rate r is the same for all
homes.
13 
As r is the price of renting a home for the period, it bears no connection to the end-
of-period price P(.).  However, when a household considers buying a positive-equity tenure
contract (i.e., one with a > 0), it will have to take into account both these sets of prices. 
We model the process by which a household negotiates a tenure contract as follows.  At the
beginning of the period, each household selects a distinct home to move into under the rental
contract {0, r}.  It then can renegotiate and offer a positive-equity contract {a > 0, b > r}
to the existing owner, who then can either accept or reject the offer.  The outcome of this
negotiation process (which is studied below) will depend on r and P(.), and will determine
the cost of equity for the household.
D.  Intertemporal Utility
We find it eminently reasonable to assume that all households desire intertemporal
consumption smoothing, and face a credit market imperfection with respect to the cost of
borrowing.  We incorporate these assumptions in our model in a very simple manner by
specifying the following features:  (a) every household has a minimum subsistence
requirement, and (b) there is a wedge between the saving and the borrowing rate.  We
formalize this in the following way. 
Consider a household with income y.  Suppose that it negotiates a tenure contract {a,
                    
     
13  We could derive this property of a common rental rate by studying many explicit
trading mechanisms.  For instance, if we posited that the households got to select their homes
through an auction, this would yield a common rental rate r
auction under which the renter
would obtain all the surplus.  Alternatively, if we considered a mechanism where each owner
posted a rental price for their units, this would give rise to a common rental rate r
posted which
would give all the surplus to the owners.  It can be easily verified that any common rental
rate r ˛ [r
auction, r
posted] would be a Walrasian equilibrium price in our model, given the
equality of the measure of housing units and of the potential residents.11
b}, borrows an amount b, and takes an action a.  Then, if x is the fraction of high-effort
households in the community, the household's intertemporal payoff is:
 [y - b + b] + [Q
0 + q(a,x) - a] + d{w - R(b)b + aP(a,x)}     if y-b+b ‡ 0,
(1)
                - ¥ otherwise; 
where d is the discount factor, R(b) is the "gross rate of interest", and (for simplicity) a
represents the disutility to a household from taking action a.
14  Further, we posit that the
gross rate of interest function R(.) satisfies the following condition:
R(b)  =   
 1 + rS   for b < 0,
with 1 + rS < 1/d < 1+ rB. (2)
                             1 + rB   for b > 0,
Utility specification (1) is a very simple way of modelling a household's desire to
smooth nondurable consumption.  Treating the (unmodeled) consumption good as the
numeraire, (1) posits a minimum subsistence level for this good (which for simplicity is
normalized at zero) without which the household's utility is unboundedly low.
15  (2) specifies
the existence of a simple form of credit market imperfection:  when a household borrows, the
gross interest rate is greater than its marginal rate of time preference.  Let C ” d(1+rB) - 1
> 0 denote the magnitude of this wedge.  The wedge discourages borrowing, but if b > y,
the household will have to borrow to meet its subsistence requirement in the current period. 
Given (1) and (2), it is easy to show that a household will optimally borrow the amount
max{b - y, 0}.
                    
     
14  To interpret this two-period utility function, recall the story in footnote 8 where
individuals live for three periods.  Utility function (1) is relevant for a household of adults at
the time that they start their careers.  At that point, they have two periods ahead of them -
working life, and retired life.  Their first period utility derives from net income [y - b + b]
and from housing quality net of effort costs [Q
0 + q(a,x) - a], and their second period utility
derives from their future income {w - R(b)b + aP(a,x)}.
     
15  Utility specification (1) is silent about a household's payoff if it defaults on its debt in
the future, or equivalently, if it cannot finance non-negative non-durable consumption in the
future after repaying its debt.  We will simply assume that when a household finds it optimal
to borrow, it will be able to repay its debt.  This assumption keeps the analysis simple, but
can be relaxed at little cost.12
E.  Home-ownership and Home Improvement
As discussed in the Introduction, there is considerable evidence that home-ownership is a
determinant of behavior (controlling for other attributes).  We now formalize this idea. 
We assume that high home improvement effort entails a current period cost to the
household and a future return in the form of capital gains.  In the current period, the net
surplus from expending high effort (as opposed to low effort) is:  s0(x) ” [q(e,x) - e] - [q(n,x)
- n]; the analogous net surplus in the future is:  s1(x) ” P(e,x) - P(n,x).  In present value
terms, the total net surplus is thus:  S(x) ” s0(x) + ds1(x).  We assume that
Assumption 2.   S(x) > 0 and s0(x) < 0 for all x ˛ [0, 1].
From (1), for a household with equity share of a, the net return to expending high
effort is s0(x) + ads1(x).  Assumption 2 says that this return is strictly increasing in a, with
it being negative for a "pure renter" (for whom a = 0) and positive for "pure home-owner"
(for whom a = 1).  The assumption captures the fundamental incentive problem that a
household faces in our model ? it will have an incentive to expend high effort if and only if it
has a high enough stake in the asset value of its home.  The level of that critical stake is
a*(x) ˛ (0, 1), where
a*(x) = -s0(x)/ds1(x).  (3)
Then, defining a
0(a, x) to be a household's optimal action when it holds an equity share a,
we have that a
0(a, x) = e for a ‡ a*(x), and a
0(a, x) = n for a < a*(x).
We assume throughout, for expositional simplicity, that r < Y
-, so that no
household has to borrow simply to pay the rent.   Then, if a household with current income y
stays renter (with a = 0), it will expend only minimal effort (a
0 = n) and will have a lifetime
payoff of
u
n(y,x,r) = [y - r] + [Q
0 + q(n,x) - n] + dw. (4)
In this case, the (expected) present value payoff (calculated in the current period) to the13
existing owner of the housing unit will be [r + dP(n,x)].
16
We now study the outcome of contract renegotiation by a household after it has
accepted a rental contract {0, r} for a particular home.  As described in the previous
subsection, the price of equity is determined by a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the household,
with a status quo point of no renegotiation.
17  Then, for any equity level a, define b
0(a,x,r)
to be the price of equity such that the existing owner gets the same payoff under {a, b
0(.)} as
under {0, r}:
           b
0(a,x,r) + d[1-a]P(a
0(a,x), x) = r + dP(n,x).
18 (5)
If the household decides to buy a amount of equity, then it will offer the price b
0(a,x,r) and
the owner will accept the renegotiated contract {a, b
0(a,x,r)}.
19 
Starting from {0, r}, how much equity should a household buy?  That depends on the
price of the critical level of equity a*(x).  Let b* represent this price, i.e., let b*(x,r) ” b
0(a
= a*(x),x,r).  We will refer to this as the price of home-ownership since, as will be shown
below, once a household pays this price and buys the critical amount of equity, its subsequent
behavior will be identical to that of a pure home-owner.  It is easy to see that
            b*(x,r) = r + a*(x)dP(n,x) - S(x).
20 (6)
                    
     
16  If there are multiple partial owners of the home, [r + dP(n,x)] will be their aggregate
payoff as long as they are (effectively) risk-neutral.
     
17  The posited contract renegotiation process gives the household the entire surplus that is
generated from renegotiation.  Any alternative negotiation process will yield qualitatively
similar results as long as under such a process, the household obtains some of the surplus that
is generated.
     
18  Left-hand side of (5) is the present value payoff to the owner under {a, b
0(.)}.  In
calculating it, she recognizes that the household will expend that level of effort that is
"sequentially optimal" for it. 
     
19  This will also be true when there are multiple existing owners of the home.  Implicit in
our model is the assumption that an owner cannot provide direct credit to the household at a
rate more favorable than rB; inter-agent trade in credit cannot undo the credit market
imperfection. 
     
20  Note that if the owner holds the pessimistic view that the household will not expend14
The lifetime payoff to a household with current income y after renegotiating to the
tenure contract {a*(x), b*(x,r)} is thus
u
e(y,x,r) = u
n(y,x,r) + S(x) - max{C[b*(x,r) - y], 0}. (7)
This payoff takes an intuitive form.  Starting from {0, r}, there is a gain and a (potential)
loss for the household in renegotiating to a*(x).  The gain is the net surplus S(x), while there
is a loss of C[b* - y] if the price of home-ownership exceeds the household's current income,
so that the household is forced to borrow the difference (b* - y).  There is thus a critical
income level y*(x,r) such that the gain is equal to the loss:
y*(x,r) = b*(x,r) - S(x)/C. (8)
We assume that given r, and for any x, when a household with income y ‡ y*(x,r) borrows
to finance the equity purchase of a*(x), its future earnings are enough to repay its loan.
21 
The above arguments establish the following result which characterizes a household's
optimal decisions regarding tenure and home improvement. 
Result 1:  Given a level of community effort x, and the rental rate r, for a household with
current income y:  (a) if y < y*(x,r), it buys too little equity (a < a*(x)) and expends
minimal effort, (b) if y > y*(x,r), it buys sufficient equity (a ‡ a*(x)) and expends high
effort, and (c) if y = y*(x,r), it is indifferent between the above courses of action.
22  The
                                                           
high effort, she should charge [r + a*(x)dP(n,x)] for equity level a*(x).  However, once the
household buys a*(x), both parties recognize that it will put in high effort, and this leads to
the discount S(x).
     
21  This guarantees that any household that finds it optimal to borrow does not default on
its debt.  If we did not make this assumption, and posited a future subsistence requirement,
we would have a higher critical level of income at which a household would be indifferent
between buying a*(x) and staying renter.  However, even then we would have the result (as
in Result 1) that a household buys sufficient equity if and only if its income is above a critical
level.  That is all that is required for our analysis.
     
22  Specifically, for any y > b*(x,r), the household is indifferent among a ˛ [a*(x),
min{a
+,1}] where a
+ is such that y = b
0(a
+,x,r); for any y ˛ (y*(x,r), b*(x,r)], it buys
exactly a*(x); and for any y < y*(x,r), it is indifferent among a ˛ [0, a
-] where a
- < a*(x)
is such that y = b
0(a
-,x,r).15
household's maximized intertemporal payoff is:  u*(y, x, r) = max{u
n(y, x, r), u
e(y, x, r)}.
Every household in our model recognizes the following incentive problem - it is
better to be "enough of a home-owner" and obtain the surplus from home improvement. 
However, due to the capital market imperfection, the marginal cost of acquiring home equity
is greater for a poorer household.
23  As a result, a household becomes a home-owner if and
only if it is sufficiently rich.  Due to the endogenous choice of contracts, even though low-
income households do not have different preferences for housing quality than high-income
households, and even though they internalize externalities no less than the latter do, the low-
and high-income households behave differently - the rich home-owners making greater
efforts towards home improvement than the poor renters.  For ease of presentation, we will
subsequently refer to a household that invests in home improvement (after buying sufficient
equity) as a home-owner, and one that does not as a renter. 
F.  Community Equilibrium
Our objective is to study the properties of the equilibrium tenure choices of households with
different income levels, and the concomitant distribution of housing quality in the
community.
A community equilibrium in our model is completely described by the equilibrium
fraction of home-owners, x*.  Any fraction x of home-owners, and the common rental rate r,
give rise to a unique cut-off income level y*(x,r) as defined in (8).  This cut-off, given the
income distribution, in turn determines the fraction of home-owners in the community.  So,
                    
     
23  There are a variety of factors that raise the price of home equity for poor households,
which are omitted from the model for brevity.  These include tax subsidies to home-
ownership (interest deductibility) and also the fact that higher loan-to-value ratios expose the
lender to greater risk that the value of the collateral will fall below the principal and interest
due.  Another factor is that default risk due to income shocks is likely to be greater for the
poor and thus generate higher transactions costs, which would then be reflected in higher
interest rates charged.16
given r, x* is an equilibrium if and only if limy › y*(x*,r)F(y) £ 1- x* £ F(y*(x*,r)).
24
To determine the properties of a community equilibrium, we note, from (6) and (8),
that
¶y*/¶x  =  {dP(n,x).da*/dx - (1 + 1/C)S¢(x)} + {a*(x)dPx(n,x)}. (9)
The first bracketed term in the above expression is negative by Assumption 1(c), while the
second term is positive by Assumption 1(b).  With an increase in x, complementarity among
residents' actions implies a fall in the level of the critical equity a*(x)
25, and an increase in
the surplus S(x).  Both these effects lower the price of home-ownership and thus y*.  On the
other hand, the spillover effect implies that when x increases the owner's reservation price
for the home goes up for every effort level, which increases the price of home-ownership and
thus y*.
We now argue that whether there can be one or many equilibria (in terms of the
fraction of home-owners) in the community depends critically on whether or not y* is an
increasing function of x.  Suppose that there are two equilibria x1* and x2* with x1* > x2*. 
Note that if ¶y*/¶x ‡ 0 for all x, then y*(x1*,r) ‡ y*(x2*,r).  But this implies that any
household not investing at x1* (when the income cut-off is high) must not be investing at x2*
(when the income cut-off is low), i.e. x1* £ x2*, and we have a contradiction.  This
establishes that when y* is increasing in x everywhere, there can be at most a single
equilibrium fraction of home-owners in the community.  However, if y* decreases in x for
some x, the above argument also indicates that there can be multiple equilibria in the
community. 
We collect the conclusions of the above analysis in the following result.  The result
                    
     
24  All households with y < y* buy insufficient equity, requiring the first inequality; and
the largest measure of households buying insufficient equity can be all households with y £
y*, requiring the second inequality.  The equilibrium condition allows for the existence of an
atom in F(.) at y*(x,r).
     
25  From (3), da*/dx = -a*(x){[(s0¢(x)/-s0(x)] + [s1¢(x)/s1(x)]}, which is strictly negative
under Assumption 1(c).  The complementarity effect implies that for a higher level of
community effort, a household needs to own less equity in its home to have an incentive for
home improvement. 17
asserts that a community equilibrium always exists.  This follows from standard fixed-point
arguments, and the "existence proof" is available from the authors upon request.
Result 2:  Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a community equilibrium, defined by the fraction of
home-owners, x*, exists for any given r.  If  ¶y*/¶x ‡ 0 for all x, then the equilibrium is
unique.
26  If not, then there can be multiple equilibria. 
At this stage, it is important to recognize the following.  If the complementarity
effect in the community is sufficiently strong relative to the spillover effect, it will be the
case that the cut-off income level y* decreases in x for some values of x.  It is clear from (9)
that for any given magnitude of the spillover effect on P(n,x), there exists a positive number
e such that if st¢(x) > e for t = 0, 1, then  ¶y*/¶x < 0 everywhere.
27  In our subsequent
analysis we will assume this to be the case, and will identify it as Condition (*):
Condition (*):  For all x ˛ [0, 1], ¶y*/¶x < 0.
Result 2 states that when Condition (*) holds, there can be multiple equilibria in
terms of tenure choices and residents' investments in home improvement.  Furthermore, it is
easy to establish (from (4), (7), and (8)) that for every household, its maximized
intertemporal payoff u*(y,x,r) is strictly increasing in x when Condition (*) holds.  This
implies the following result.
Result 3:  Suppose Condition (*) holds.  If there are multiple equilibria in the community
with different values of x*, these equilibria are Pareto ranked.  All residents are strictly
better off in an equilibrium with a higher fraction of home-owners as compared to one with a
lower fraction.
                    
     
26  This statement includes the "benchmark case" where community effort has no effect on
the quality of an individual home, that is, where qx(a,x) = 0.  In that case, ¶y*/¶x = 0 for
all x, and the equilibrium x* is uniquely determined by the income distribution function
given the rental rate r.
     
27  In our specification, community effort affects only the return from an individual
household's effort in home improvement, and not the cost of making that effort.  If, defining
c(a,x) to be the disutility of effort a given x, we assume that cx(e,x) < cx(n,x), this will
increase the magnitude of the complementarity effect, s0¢(x), without changing the magnitude
of the spillover effect Px(n,x).18
When the complementarity effect in the community is strong, the households face a
coordination problem:  if a large fraction of residents buy sufficient equity in their homes,
the aggregate level of investment in home improvement will be high; in turn, this will
encourage a large fraction of residents to buy equity in their homes.  Result 3 indicates that
any coordination failure has costs for each and every resident of the community.  The
existence of this coordination problem also predicts the following equilibrium correlation:  a
community with a higher proportion of home-owners should exhibit the feature that residents
make higher levels of private investment towards their quality of life, and that the aggregate
"community quality" is higher.  As mentioned in the Introduction, there is evidence that such
correlation is indeed observed across different communities in the US.
In Appendix A, we present a set of examples which demonstrate various features of
community equilibria in our model.  Example A1 demonstrates how there can be multiple
equilibria in a single community when the complementarity effect is strong enough.
Given the possibility of multiple equilibria, it is of interest to enquire as to how the
set of equilibria depends on the degree of income inequality among households.  Within its
specific structure, Example A1 provides an interesting answer to this question:  The set of
equilibria shrinks as the level of inequality increases.  For low levels of inequality, all
residents of the community (i.e., both rich and poor households)being home-owners is an
equilibrium, as is all residents being renters.  However, for high levels of inequality, the
unique equilibrium outcome is one where all rich households are owners while all poor
households are renters.  So, while a decrease in inequality can be welfare-enhancing for
community residents if they can coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium, it can also
make the cost of not being able to solve the coordination problem greater.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is ongoing debate in the US as to how to
encourage home-ownership by middle- and low-income households.  The role of "housing
subsidy" remains an important part of this debate.  Our analysis emphasizes the following
point regarding the efficacy of housing subsidy as an instrument to promote home-ownership.
 A housing subsidy can increase the proportion of home-owners in a community by
eliminating certain Pareto inferior equilibrium outcomes.  But it is important to note that
"incremental" amounts of housing subsidy may fail to do so.  In the context of Example A1,
it can be easily established that there will exist a critical amount of subsidy that is required to
make a difference.  This is consistent with the recognition by some policy-makers like US19
Secretary Cuomo of the existence of a "threshold effect". 
3.  Multiple Communities and Segregation
In the previous section, we have considered the case where all households of a
particular generation choose their homes in a single community.  In effect, such a
specification implies that the interaction effects between residents exist over the entire
metropolitan area where they live.  However, in many real world scenarios, such interactions
are more localized.  There are multiple communities within a city, with there being
significant local interaction effects within a community, and very little across communities. 
In this section, we extend our model to incorporate such a scenario where there are multiple
communities in a metropolitan area, and where each household has to choose the community
in which it wants to live.  Within this structure, we study how different households sort
themselves across communities.
28
We let the metropolitan area consist of two communities, each having single-family
homes of measure half.  As before, a generation of households is of measure one, and current
income y is distributed according to F(.) on Y ” [Y
-, Y
+].  In the period of our study, each
household has to choose one of the two communities to live in.  A household's subsequent
choices regarding tenure, home improvement, etc., are as described in Section 2, as is its
payoff.  As indicated above, we assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for each of the two
communities individually, and that there are no cross-community effects.
We assume that at the beginning of the period of our study, every home in
community i (for i = 1, 2) is of the same quality level Q
0
i.  Further, for our formal analysis,




2.  As in Section 2, we make this assumption
since we are interested in analyzing how differences in housing quality both within and across
communities arise through household choices, starting from an initial situation of equality. 






                    
     
28  Our model is similar to the model used by Benabou (1994, 1996) to analyze
stratification in a metropolitan area.  But his model treats the household's "type" as a datum,
whereas in our model, a household's "type" is its endogenous tenure choice (or, equivalently,
its home improvement effort level) which depends both on its income and on the
characteristics of the community in which it resides.20
For any community i, define xi to be the fraction of resident households who are
home-owners (i.e., who expend high home improvement effort), ri to be the (common) rental
rate, and Yi to be the set of incomes y such that household y resides in community i.  In this
two-community model, we take the following prices as primitives:  (a) the beginning-of-
period common rental rate r1* ˛ (0, Y
-) for each home in community 1, and (b) the end-of-
period present value of a home in community i, P(a, xi).
29  A two-community equilibrium is a
vector {r2*, (x1*, Y1*), (x2*, Y2*)} which satisfies the following conditions:  (1) Y1* and Y2*
are partitions of Y such that the measure of households with income y ˛ Yi (for i = 1, 2) is
half; (2) given ri* in community i, xi* is a community equilibrium as described in Section 2;
and (3) for all y ˛ Yi*, u*(y, xi*, ri*) ‡ u*(y, xj*, rj*) for j = / i, with u*(.) as defined in
Result 1.
Our objective is to determine conditions under which there will be segregation in a
two-community equilibrium, either in terms of tenure choice (segregation of owners and
renters) or in terms of income (segregation of the rich and the poor).  As mentioned in the
Introduction, there is some evidence of such segregation across communities in the US.  We
will say that an equilibrium exhibits "tenure segregation" if across the two communities
either all owners live in the same community, or all renters live in the same community, or
both.
30  An equilibrium will be said to exhibit "income segregation" if all residents of one
community are richer, in that their current incomes y are (weakly) greater, than all residents
of the other community.
We begin by delineating a special class of equilibria in the two-community model
which do not exhibit either tenure- or income-segregation.  These are the symmetric
equilibria where the fraction of home-owners in a community is the same across the two
communities:  x1* = x2*.
31  Under our assumption that the initial quality of all homes are the
                    
     
29  In this two-community model, once the current-period rental rate in one of the
communities is taken as given, the (common) rental rate in the other community will be
determined in equilibrium.
     
30  If all residents across the two communities make the same tenure choice in equilibrium
(i.e., if either x1* = x2* = 0 or x1* = x2* = 1), we will say that there is no tenure
segregation in equilibrium.
     
31  Obviously, such an equilibrium does not exhibit tenure segregation.  Further, it must
have r2* = r1*, and thus y*(x1*, r1*) = y*(x2*, r2*).  Then, if x1* = x2* ˛ (0, 1), all21
same, the next result establishes that any such equilibrium is a "replication" of a single-
community equilibrium (where the latter refers to our single-community model with the
community having a continuum of homes of measure one ).  Proofs of all results in this
section are presented in Appendix B.





0,  there exists an equilibrium with x1* = x2* = x* in the
two-community model if and only if x* is a single-community equilibrium given Q
0 and r1*.
Result 4 indicates that within the structure of our model, there can exist equilibria in
a multi-community model where there is no segregation.  This is the case when the
equilibrium outcome in each of the communities is a mirror image of what would happen in
equilibrium if the communities were "merged" into a single one.  However, as our next
result shows, such symmetric equilibria are not "robust" in a specific sense.
Result 5:  If Q
0
1 = / Q
0
2, then generically (for arbitrary income distribution functions F(.)), an
"interior" symmetric two-community equilibrium (i.e., with common x* ˛ (0, 1)) cannot
exist. 
The intuition behind Result 5 is as follows.  When initial housing quality is identical




2, every symmetric equilibrium has the feature that all home-
owners (across the two communities) are indifferent as to which community they live in. 
This allows one to take the total set of all households who want to be owners and equally
divide them across the communities.  However, when Q
0
1 = / Q
0
2, this indifference property is
lost, and generically, it is not possible to find equal-sized sets of home-owners for each of the
two communities.
32
Given the above result, we now turn our attention to studying asymmetric equilibria
in the two-community model, where the fraction of home-owners in a community differ
across the two communities.  Our aim is to determine conditions under which such equilibria
                                                           
owners in community 1 are richer than all renters in community 2, and vice versa, and there
is no income segregation.
     
32  Even when Q
0
1 = / Q
0
2, a symmetric equilibrium with either x* = 0 or x* = 1 is not
necessarily unstable.  However, note that in the class of symmetric equilibria, it is only in
"interior" equilibria that all households do not make the same tenure choice.  So, given our
interest in studying segregation, this is the interesting class of equilibria to focus on.22





2, and without loss of generality, we will consider the case where x1* > x2*.
We present a condition under which an asymmetric equilibrium in the two-
community model must exhibit tenure segregation:
Condition (**):  For all x ˛ [0,1], -¶y*/¶x > qx(n,x).
Condition (**) is a strengthening of Condition (*) (in Section 2F) - it not only requires that
the complementarity effect be strong so that the cut-off income level y* is strictly decreasing
in x, but that it be strong enough so that the magnitude of this decline is greater than the
magnitude of the spillover effect on q(n,x).
Result 6:  Assume that Condition (**) holds.  Then every asymmetric equilibrium in the
two-community model exhibits tenure segregation.
The intuition behind the above result is as follows.  Let us start from a situation of
no tenure segregation where there are home-owners and renters in both communities with 1
> x1 > x2 > 0.  Then given that community effort is greater in community 1, why wouldn't
the home-owners in community 2 prefer to move?  The only reason could be that the cost of
home-ownership is higher in community 1 (one fact contributing to this is that r1 must be
higher than r2 for there to be renters in both communities).  However, Condition (**)
ensures that that would not be the case in this scenario, and so home-owners in community 2
would indeed want to relocate.  This would result in tenure segregation.
Result 6 states that in a multi-community world, when the complementarity effect of
neighbors' efforts is sufficiently stronger than the spillover effect, home-owners will indeed
want to reside together.
33  What if the former effect is not that strong?  Example A2 in
Appendix A shows that if Condition (**) does not hold, there can exist asymmetric equilibria
in two-community model which are not tenure segregated. 
For our subsequent analysis, we will maintain that Condition (**) holds.  Then
                    
     
33  Note that for any given magnitudes of the complementarity effect, st¢(x), there exists
an c > 0, such that if the magnitude of the spillover effect, qx(n,x), is smaller than c,
Condition (**) will hold.23
Result 6 implies that asymmetric equilibria in the two-community model can be of three
kinds.  Firstly, there can be equilibria with x1* ˛ (0, 1) and x2* = 0, where it is only the
owners who are concentrated in a single community.  We will call such an equilibrium to be
"owner stratified".  Secondly, there can be "renter stratified" equilibria with x1* = 1 and x2*
0 (0, 1), where it is only the renters who are concentrated in a single community.  And
finally, there can be equilibria with x1* = 1 and x2* = 0, which are "completely stratified".
We now ask the question:  Will the three kinds of tenure segregated equilibria
described above also exhibit income segregation?  We begin by considering an example,
Example A3 in Appendix A, where a tenure segregated equilibrium is not income segregated.
 In this example, in equilibrium, all middle-income households (whose measure is half) are
home-owners in community 1, while all high- and low-income households (each of whose
measure is a quarter) live in community 2 with the former being home-owners and the latter
being renters.  There are two special features of this example which make such an
equilibrium outcome possible.  Firstly, the income distribution is such that the equilibrium is
renter stratified.  And secondly, the high-income households are so rich that they do not have
to borrow to finance the purchase of their housing equity.  Recognizing these features of
Example A3, the following analysis presents sufficient conditions under which there can be
income segregation in equilibrium.
We partition Y ” [Y
-, Y
+] into two sets, Y
H and Y
L, such that the measures of
households with income y ˛ Y
H and households with income y ˛ Y
L are each half, and that
y¢ ‡ y† for all y¢ ˛ Y
H and y† ˛ Y
L.  We define the income level Y
m to be the infimum of the
set Y
H.
34  Recognize that if a two-community equilibrium is to be income segregated, it must
be that all households with current incomes in Y
H live in one community, while those with
current incomes in Y
L live in the other.    
Our next result states that as long as an asymmetric equilibrium is not renter
segregated, it can be "supported" as an income segregated equilibrium in the following sense.
Result 7:  Assume that Condition (**) holds.  Suppose that there exists a two-community
equilibrium with x1* ˛ (0, 1] and x2* = 0.  Then there exists an equilibrium with the same
                    
     
34  Note the following:  Firstly, the sets Y
H and Y
L are unique (up to sets of measure zero
under F).  Secondly, y¢ ‡ Y
m ‡ y† for all y¢ ˛ Y
H and y† ˛ Y
L.  And finally, if the median
income in Y under F is unique, then it equals Y
m.24
(x1*, x2*) pair (and the same rental rates) where Y1* = Y
H and Y2* = Y
L.
In words, Result 7 says the following:  Consider a two-community equilibrium which
is either owner stratified or completely stratified.  While this equilibrium need not necessarily
exhibit income segregation, there will exist another equilibrium with the same outcome (in
terms of the fractions of home-owners in each of the two communities), where all community
1 residents will be (weakly) richer than all community 2 residents. 
The intuition behind Result 7 is as follows.  In an owner stratified equilibrium, all
renters are indifferent as to which community they rent in.  So, it can be that some renters in
community 2 are richer than some renters in community 1, thereby violating income
segregation.  However, as they are indifferent between the two communities, they can be
"appropriately relocated" so as to generate income segregation.
Next, consider a completely stratified equilibrium.  There, a household with income
y¢ > Y
m can be renting in community 2 and a household with income y† < Y
m can be
owning in community 1, thereby violating tenure segregation.  However, this can happen if
and only if the following are true:  (a) both households are indifferent between owning in
community 1 and renting in community 2, and (b) both households are rich enough so that
they would not have to borrow to finance home equity purchase if they wanted to be home-
owners in community 1.  The former result implies that the households can be relocated so as
to generate income segregation.  The latter result allows us to assert the following corollary
to Result 7:  Suppose Condition (**) holds, and suppose that Y
m < b*(1,r1*), i.e., a
household with income Y
m needs to borrow to finance home equity in community 1.  Then
any completely stratified equilibrium must exhibit income segregation.
It is not implausible to assume that Y
m < b*(1,r1*).  In fact, given that in the real
world almost all households take some mortgage when buying a home, it may be reasonable
to assume the following in the context of our model:  Y
+ < b*(1,r1*), i.e., every household,
no matter how rich it is, needs to borrow to finance home equity.  If we do assume this (in
contrast to our specification in Example A3), we have the result that every renter stratified
equilibrium in the two-community model can be supported as an income segregated
equilibrium. 
Result 8:  Assume that Condition (**) holds, and that Y
+ < b*(1,r1*).  Suppose that a two-
community equilibrium with x1* = 1 and x2* ˛ (0, 1) exists.  Then there exists an25





The above results lead to the following general conclusion:  When the
complementarity effect in a community is sufficiently stronger than the spillover effect (so
that Condition (**) holds), its direct consequence is that every asymmetric equilibrium in a
multi-community world exhibits tenure segregation.  On the other hand, every such
equilibrium is not necessarily income segregated.  However, under the plausible assumption
that any household desiring to own a home has to take out a mortgage, the phenomenon of
income segregation is "consistent" with such equilibrium outcomes (in the sense made precise
in Results 7 and 8).
4.  Conclusion
This paper provides one model of the mechanisms through which externalities associated with
home-ownership work.  It shows that in a setting in which home-ownership resolves a moral
hazard problem and low-wealth households face high transactions cost in the credit market, it
is possible that communities with very different social structures "self-organize," with the
rich in communities with high home-ownership and high community engagement, and the
poor in communities with low levels of both.
We should note that an important factor contributing to residents' investments in their
homes and communities is residential stability.  diPasquale and Glaeser (1998) find that the
lower mobility of homeowners contributes importantly to the difference in behavior between
homeowners and renters.  Compared to homeowners, who face high transactions costs of
moving, renters are more likely to choose to leave when neighborhood conditions worsen. 
When conditions improve, land rents increase and renters are more likely to be unable to
afford to live in the neighbor they helped create.  Our model abstracts from these factors by
assuming that exogenous life cycle events determine mobility. Incorporating these factors
would strengthen most of the results of the paper, since these factors provide additional
                    
     
35  Again, the intuition is as follows:  When a renter stratified equilibrium is not income
segregated, the households "responsible" for this have incomes such that they are indifferent
between owning in either community.  Then they can be appropriately relocated so as to
maintain the equilibrium fractions of home-owners in the two communities, and generate
income segregation. 26
incentives--besides their asset stake--for homeowners to take the "long" view of the return to
home improvement efforts.
Two other limitations of our analysis should be mentioned.   Our analysis does not
apply where a household can own an arbitrarily low-cost home.  In that case, low income
would be no bar to ownership.  It also does not apply where residents are so wealthy that
they are able and willing to buy the kind of services that we have implicitly assumed only
residents can provide.  If residents, both homeowners and renters, prefer to pay for such
services through the market or, as in many European countries, to support a high level of
public services provided by the national government, then home-ownership and "community
quality," in the sense in which that term is used here, will no longer be linked.  Rental units
that serve a wealthy clientele do provide janitorial and security services, and the rules which
they often impose on residents provide a substitute for community-generated and policed
standards of behavior.
But where ownership entails a "lumpy" capital investment and where the cost is
prohibitive of purchasing a substitute for residents' home improvement efforts, the model
suggests that reforms in the housing market to permit residents to own a share of the equity
of their homes may hold some promise in easing the plight of troubled, crime-ridden
communities and expanding the self-help capacity of the poor.  Temporary subsidies to home-
ownership, such as the U.S. has undertaken in selling off public housing projects to long-
term residents, may also be able to play a role in permanently improving communities. 
The theory presented in this paper can be taken as a kind of "parable of capitalism,"
where individuals' decisions to purchase equity affect their efforts, which then affect the
payoffs to others.  The theory applies to a variety of other situations, for example, the choice
between entrepreneurship and wage-earning and the formation of industrial belts.  For
example, suppose that each firm is managed either by a wage-earner or by someone with an
equity stake in the firm (an "entrepreneur").  Suppose also that only entrepreneurs with a
sufficiently high equity stake in the firm will have an incentive to expend high effort; there is
moral hazard in the supply of effort.  Consider a situation in which all individuals are
intrinsically the same, but differ in (inherited) wealth.  Each individual in a given generation
chooses whether to become an entrepreneur or a salaried manager, employed by a member of
the older generation.  Because of credit market imperfections and because entrepreneurship
requires purchasing an equity stake, an individual with lower initial wealth faces a higher
cost of becoming an entrepreneur.  But entrepreneurs have stronger incentives and so produce27
greater surplus.  Moreover, their efforts have spillovers; over some range these spillovers
increase the payoffs to entrepreneurs more than those to salaried managers.
36  When these
feedback effects are present, again, just as in the model of home-ownership in a residential
community, there may be multiple equilibria in the threshold wealth level above which an
individual will choose to become an entrepreneur; and there may be stratification of
entrepreneurial firms in industrial belts. We intend to examine these applications in future
work.
                    
     
36For evidence of local spillovers across firms, see Henderson (1995) and Wallsten
(1999).28
Appendix A
This Appendix presents a set of examples that demonstrate various features of community
equilibria in our model. 
Example A1
This example demonstrates how there can be multiple equilibria in a single community when
the complementarity effect is strong enough.  The example also illustrates the way in which
the distribution of income "maps" into community equilibria.
We posit a very simple structure of income distribution.  Half the population of
households are `rich' with per period income Y + z, and the other half are `poor' with per
period income Y - z, with z ˛ (0, Y).  Note that the mean income of the population is Y, and
that z is a measure of the extent of income inequality in the population.  In this example, we
will be interested in looking at the set of community equilibria for a given value of z, and in
determining how this set changes as z changes.  We will not be explicit about the functional
forms of q(.) and P(.), but will simply posit that ¶y*/¶x < 0 so that the following chain of
inequalities hold (we hold fixed the initial rental rate r, and abuse notation to denote the cut-
off income level y*(x, r) by y*(x)):
2Y > y*(x=0) > y*(x=0.5) > Y > y*(x=1) > 0. (14)
Define z0 such that Y + z0 = y*(0); z0.5 such that Y + z0.5 = y*(0.5); and z1 such that Y - z1
= y*(1).  Note that z0 > z0.5, and the inequalities in (14) imply that z0, z0.5, and z1 are all
strictly between 0 and Y.
Given the above structure, the following results are easy to establish:  (1) x* = 0 is a
community equilibrium if and only if z £ z0.  (2) x* = 0.5 is an equilibrium if and only if z
‡ z0.5.  (3) x* = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if z £ z1.  (4) An x* ˛ (0, 0.5) is an
equilibrium if and only if z ˛ (z0.5, z0).  (5) An x* ˛ (0.5, 1) is an equilibrium if and only if z
< z1.
The above results enable us to determine the set of community equilibria for every
value of z ˛ (0, Y).  Consider the case where z1 ˛ (z0.5, z0).  Here, there are multiple
equilibria for all values of z ˛ (0, z
0].  For small levels of income inequality, i.e., z ˛ (0,29
z0.5), all households becoming home-owners is an equilibrium outcome, as is all households
staying renters.  For a higher level of income inequality, i.e., z ˛ (z?, z1), in addition to the
above two equilibrium outcomes, there is a community equilibrium where only the rich
become home-owners.  This latter outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome when income
inequality is very high, i.e., when z > z
0.  
Example A2
This example shows that when Condition (**) is not satisfied, there can exist asymmetric
two-community equilibria which are not tenure segregated.  We consider the following
income distribution structure:  there are positive measures of high-, middle-, and low-income
households.  Let yH denote the high-income level, yM the middle-income level, and yL the
low-income level; and let mj (> 0) denote the measure of households with income level j, for
j = H, M, L.  We posit that 0.5 > mH > mM.  Our proposed equilibrium has the following
outcome:  All high-income households are home-owners in community 1, all middle-income
households are home-owners in community 2, and all low-income households are renters
across the two communities.  This is a non-segregated outcome with 1 > x1 = 2mH > x2 =
2mM > 0. 
As there are renters in both communities in this outcome, the equilibrium rental rates
have to satisfy: r1 - r2 = q(n,x1) - q(n,x2).  For i = 1,2, define y*i = y*(xi,ri), b*i =
b*(xi,ri).  Contrary to Condition (**), we posit that y*1 > y*2, but assume that [y*1 - y*2] is
small so that b*2 > y*1.  Then, we have the following chain of inequalities:  b*1 > b2 >
y*1 > y2*.  Next, we posit that the three income levels satisfy the following conditions:  yL
< y2* so that a low-income household will rent in either community; y1* < yM < b*(x2,r2)
so that a middle-income household will be a credit-constrained owner in either community;
and yH = b*1 - e > b*2 for some e > 0 so that a high-income household will be an owner in
either community and be credit-constrained in the former.   Note that under these parameter
specifications, for a small enough value of e, the following are true:  Each low-income
household strictly prefers to rent and is indifferent between the two communities; each
middle-income household strictly prefers to live in community 2; and each high-income
household strictly prefers to live in community 1.  Thus, under the posited parameter values,
the proposed outcome is an equilibrium.
Example A330
This example shows how a tenure segregated equilibrium may not be income segregated.  We
consider the same income distribution structure as in Example A2, and posit that mH = mL =
0.25, while mM = 0.5.  Our proposed equilibrium has the following outcome:  All middle-
income households are home-owners in community 1, and in community 2, the high-income
households are home-owners while the low-income households are renters.  This outcome is
tenure-segregated, with 1 = x1 > x2 = 0.5, but it is not income-segregated.
Given the fixed community 1 rental rate r1, define r¢ such that r1 - r¢ = [q(n,1) -
q(n,0.5)] + [S(1) - S(0.5)].  We posit that the complementarity effect is so strong that
y*(0.5,r¢) = b*(1,r1).  Then we have the following chain of inequalities:  b*(0.5,r¢) >
b*(1,r1) = y*(0.5,r¢) > y*(1,r1).  We posit that yH > b*(0.5,r¢) so that a high-income
household will be an owner in either community and will never have to borrow; yL <
y*(1,r1) so that a low-income household will be a renter in either community; and yM ˛
(y*(1,r1), b*(1,r1)) such that C[yM - y*(1,r1)] > S(1) - S(0.5) (which will be the case for yM
close to b*(1,r1)) so that a middle-income household will be a credit-constrained owner if put
in community 1 and a renter if put in community 2..  Then it is easy to establish that for a
community 2 rental rate r2 = r¢ - e, with e (positive) sufficiently close to zero, our proposed
outcome is an equilibrium where middle-income households strictly prefer to live in
community 1, while high- and low-income households strictly prefer to live in community 2.
Appendix B
In this Appendix, we present the formal proofs of the results contained in Section 3.  We will
use the following notation in the proofs:  given a two-community equilibrium, we will let yi*
” y*(xi*,ri*), bi* ” b*(xi*,ri*), qi* = q(n,xi*), and Si* = S(xi*).  Further, we indicate one
way of writing a household's maximized intertemporal payoff u*(y,x,r) which will be used
in proving many of the following results.  Given the definition of u*(.) in Result 1, note from
(4), (6), (7), and (8) that, for y £ y*(x,r), u*(y, x, r) = u
n(y, x, r), and for y > y*(x,r),
u*(y, x, r) = u
n(y, x, r) + min{C(y - y*), S(x)}.  Finally, we will use the notation ui*(y) to
denote household y's maximized intertemporal payoff when it resides in community i.
Proof of Result 4
Suppose x* is a single-community equilibrium given Q
0 and r1*.  In this equilibrium, let H*31
be the set of home-owner incomes, and let R* be the set of renter incomes.  Let H1* and H2*
be any equal-sized partition of H*, and let R1* and R2* be any equal-sized partition of R*. 
Then, setting x1* = x2* = x*, r2* = r1*, Y1* = H1* ¨ R1*, and Y1* = H2* ¨ R2*, it is







Alternatively, given the common initial quality Q
0, consider any two-community
equilibrium with x1* = x2*.  It is easily proved that in such an equilibrium, it must be that
r1* = r2* (otherwise all residents would strictly prefer to live in the community with the
lower rental rate).  Then a single-community equilibrium can be constructed with r =  r1*
= r2*, and x* = x1* = x2*, by essentially reversing the steps of the construction described
above. 
Proof of Result 5




2.  Here we will explicitly consider the dependence of P(.)
on Q
0.  Recall that P(a,x; Q
0) ” P ^(g(Q
0 + q(a,x))).  This implies that dP/dQ
0 = P ^¢.g¢ > 0. 
We will assume that d
2P/dQ
2 is non-zero on its domain, but that its absolute value is small.
For the surplus expressions, this implies that while s0 is independent of Q
0, ds1/dQ
0 is non-
zero on its domain with small absolute value.  This, in turn, implies that dy*/dQ
0 > 0. 
(When the absolute value of d
2P/dQ
02 is small, the positive effect of an increase in Q
0 on P
dominates any negative effect in determining the sign of dy*/dQ
0.)
Now suppose that there exists a two-community equilibrium with x1* = x2* = x*,
for some x* ˛ (0,1).  Then there are renters in both communities, and this immediately




2 > 0.  Then it must be that y1* > y2*.  Further, the total




2), will be distinct since d
2P/dQ
2 is
non-zero.  Then the following results can be established:  All households with income y <
y2* strictly prefer to be renters and are indifferent between the two communities.  For all










2), there exists a y¢ ˛ (y1*, b1*) such that all households with y ˛ (y2*, y¢) strictly
prefer to be home-owners in community 2, while all households with y > y¢ strictly prefer to
be home-owners in community 1.  In the former case, it is obvious that x1* = x2* = x* ˛
(0, 1) cannot be an equilibrium.  In the latter case, x1* = x2* = x* can be an equilibrium if32
and only if there are two sets of households of equal measure such that one set prefers to be
home-owners in community 1 while the other set prefers to be home-owners in community 2.
 But this cannot happen generically, that is, for arbitrary income distribution functions F(.).
Proof of Result 6
For an asymmetric equilibrium with x1* > x2* to violate tenure segregation, it must be that:
 1 > x1* > x2* > 0.  Then there are renters in both communities, and so r1* - r2* = q1* -
q2*.  Then, Condition (**) implies that y1* < y2*.  This implies that for y ˛ (y1*, y2*],
u1*(y) > q1* - r1* = q2* - r2* = u2*(y), and that for y > y2*, u1*(y) = q1* - r1* +
min{C(y - y1*), S1*} > q2* - r2* + min{C(y - y2*), S2*}= u2*(y).  This means that all
households with income y > y1* will strictly prefer to be home-owners in community 1.  But
this implies that there cannot be any home-owners in community 2, contradicting our original
supposition.
Proof of Result 7
Let E* be an equilibrium with x1* ˛ (0, 1] and x2* = 0.  First consider the case where x1* ˛
(0, 1).  Then, following the arguments presented in Result 6, it must be that all households
with income y ‡ y1* prefer to be home-owners in community 1, and all households with y <
y1* are indifferent between renting in either community.  Further, x1* < 1 implies that y1*
> Y
m.  Then it is easy to construct an equilibrium with the same (x1*, x2*, r2*) as in E*,
where Y1* = Y
H and Y2* = Y
L.  Here, all y ˛ Y
H with y ‡ y1* own in community 1, all y ˛
Y
H with y < y1* rent in community 1, and all y ˛ Y
L rent in community 2.
Next, consider the case where x1* = 1.  If Y1 = Y
H and Y2 = Y
L in E*, then there is
nothing to prove.  So suppose that there exists a subset Y¢ of Y
H such that all households
with y ˛ Y¢ rent in community 2.  Then there must exist a subset Y† of Y
L such that all
households with y ˛ Y† own in community 1.  Pick any household with income y† ˛ Y†. 
Then there must exist a household with y¢ ˛ Y¢ such that y¢ > y†.  It must be the case that
y† prefers to own in community 1 rather than rent in community 2, while the opposite is true
for y¢.  This requires:  min{C(y† - y1*), S1*} ‡ r1* - q1* - r2* + q2* ‡ min{C(y¢ - y1*), S1*}.
 This can be satisfied if and only if y† ‡ b*(1,r1*).  Since our choice of y† was arbitrary, the33
above argument implies that y ‡ b*(1,r1*) for all y ˛ Y†, and thus for all y ˛Y¢.  Further, it
must also be that r1* - r2* = q1* - q2* + S1*.  This means that all households with y ˛ Y¢
are indifferent between renting in community 2 and owning in community 1, and the same is
the case for all y ˛ Y†.  Then we can construct an equilibrium with the same (x1*, x2*, r2*)
as in E*, where Y1* = Y
H and Y2* = Y
L.  Finally, note that if Y
m < b*(1,r1*), then the
above described chain of inequalities cannot be satisfied, and in that case, the set Y¢ has to be
empty.
Proof of Result 8
Let E* be an equilibrium with x1* = 1 and x2* ˛ (0, 1).  If Y1 = Y
H and Y2 = Y
L in E*,
then there is nothing to prove.  Since Y
+ < b*(1,r1*), the corollary to Result 7 asserts that
no household with y ˛ Y
H will rent in community 2.  So suppose that there exists a subset Y¢
of Y
H such that all households with y ˛ Y¢ own in community 2.  Then there must exist a
subset Y† of Y
L such that all households with y ˛ Y† own in community 1.  We will argue
that this will be possible if and only if the following conditions hold:  y1* < y2*; y2* £ y <
b2* for all y ˛ Y†; and r1* - r2* = q1* - q2* + C[y2* - y1*].  When these conditions hold
(and given that Y
+ < b*(1,r1*)), it is easy to prove that all households with y ˛ Y† are
indifferent between owning in either community, as are all households with y ˛ Y¢.  Then we




We now prove the conditions stated above.  Pick any household with income y† ˛ Y†
who owns in community 1.  Note that if y† ‡  b2*, then all y > y† will strictly prefer to own
in community 1, implying that Y¢ is empty.  So, y† < b2*.  Then for y† to prefer to own in
community 1 rather than in community 2, we need:  C[y2* - y1*] ‡ (r1* - r2*) - (q1* -q2*) ‡ 0
(the last inequality following from the fact that there are some renters in community 2 in E*).
 This condition cannot be satisfied if y1* > y2*, or if y1* = y2* (since then r1* - r2* = q1* -
q2* and Condition (**) requires y1* < y2*).  This proves that y1* < y2*.  Given that it is
easy to prove that if either y† < y2*, or if y† ‡ y2* and y† strictly prefers to own in
community 1, then all y ˛ (y†, Y
+] strictly prefer to own in community 1, implying that Y¢
is empty.  So, as our choice of y† was arbitrary, we conclude that y2* £  y < b2* for all y ˛
Y†, and that r1* - r2* = q1* - q2* + C[y2* - y1*].34
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